DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 295 146 CS 211 223

AUTHOR Dickson, Thomas V.
TITLE The Role of the Cuban Press in International Political Communication: "Granma Weekly Review" and Castro's U.S. Policy.
PUB DATE Jul 88
NOTE 60p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (71st, Portland, OR, July 2-5, 1988).
PUB TYPE Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Reports - Research/Technical (143)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC03 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Aggression; Content Analysis; Diplomatic History; Discourse Analysis; Foreign Countries; *Foreign Policy; Government (Administrative Body); Government Role; *International Relations; *Mass Media Effects; News Media; Persuasive Discourse; *Political Attitudes; Propaganda; Public Policy; World Affairs
IDENTIFIERS *Castro (Fidel); *Cuba; Foreign News; Political Communication; Political Rhetoric; Rhetorical Devices; Rhetorical Strategies; United States

ABSTRACT

This paper reviews political symbols aimed at the United States found in "Granma Weekly Review" and in Fidel Castro's speeches to see if they have changed in a predicted manner over an 18-year period and whether changes in symbol content of "Granma" and Castro's speeches correspond. The paper first explains the functions of the Cuban media, and then recounts the history and status of U.S.-Cuban relations. Next, the paper examines Castro's attitude toward the United States. The paper then analyzes the 100 most-used symbols referring to the United States in "Granma" and finds similar symbol usage in Castro's speeches during years researchers thought to be periods of closer relations between the United States and Cuba. However, researchers found that the frequency of symbol usage in "Granma" was not similar to that found in Castro's speeches. The paper suggests that the message Castro presents in his speeches is a complex one--the message he is sending to the world community through interviews and other statements is inconsistent with the aggressive language contained in his speeches where symbol usage reflects overt Cuban policy. The paper finds that before 1974, "Granma" and Castro's speeches were similar in their use of aggressive symbols, but since then the use of aggressive symbols in "Granma" has been a better indicator of Cuban policy. Seven tables of data, nine figures of data matrix, and 67 notes are included. (MS)

**********
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
**********

ED295146

# THE ROLE OF THE CUBAN PRESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION; GRANMA WEEKLY REVIEW AND CASTRO'S U.S. POLICY

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Thomas V. Dickson

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

☐ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

A Paper Presented to the
International Communication Division
for the AEJMC Convention
July 2-5, 1988

Dr. Thomas V. Dickson
Southwest Missouri State University

CS211223



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

ABSTRACT

The purpose of the paper was to see if political symbols aimed at the United States found in Granma Weekly Review and in Castro's speeches changed in a predicted manner over an 18-year period and whether changes in symbol content of Granma and Castro's speeches corresponded. Analysis of the 100 most-used symbols referring to the United States indicated that similar symbol usage was found in Castro's speeches during years researchers thought to be periods of closer relations between the United States and Cuba. However, the frequency of symbol usage in Granma was not similar to that found in Castro's speeches. In addition, changes in use of aggressive symbols in Castro's speeches did not relate closely to changes that would have been expected based on what was thought to be Cuban policy at the time. The paper suggests that the message Castro presents in his speeches is a complex one. While the level of aggressive language contained in his speeches does not seem consistent with the message he is sending to the world community through interviews and other statements, symbol usage in his speeches still reflects overt Cuban policy. Evidence was found, however, that the role of Granma changed around 1974, when Cuba's policy toward the United States was thought to have become more conciliatory. Before that point, Granma and Castro's speeches were similar in their use of aggressive symbols. Since then, the use of aggressive symbols in Granma has been a better indicator of Cuban policy.

## THE ROLE OF THE CUBAN PRESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: GRANMA WEEKLY REVIEW AND CASTRO'S U.S. POLICY

### The Functions of the Cuban Media

The function of a channel in the social system and, thus, its content is determined by those who control it. W. Phillips Davison noted of channels that "they may be `free' or controlled; they may be vehicles for political propaganda or may serve other functions."[1] Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm commented about the way that control is exercised:

> ... (T)he press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates. Especially, it reflects the system of social control whereby the relation of individuals and institutions are adjusted.[2] Which social needs affect the content of media channels and how social and political influence are felt would seem to depend, therefore, upon the type of political system under which the medium is operating and, thus, the type of control exerted.

Research by Phillip Tichenor et al. has suggested that the media as a subsystem is interdependent with the rest of the social system and that no individual or subsystem can carry out exclusive media control.[3] In research on the Cuban media based

on Tichenor et al.'s findings, John Spicer Nichols noted that the mass media usually function in a role of "system maintenance." He wrote:

> ... Tichenor et al. say that "maintenance" does not necessarily mean perpetuating the status quo, although that may be the outcome. Rather, the research team defines "maintenance" as sustaining the system and its dynamic processes. The Cuban revolution, is, of course, an example of a dynamic process.[4]

The mass media have two functions in social system maintenance, Nichols noted: feedback control and distribution control. As to use of feedback control, he wrote that "the mass media apply corrective pressure on subsystems that may be out of functional balance with the total system or on the system itself."[5] He added about the other function:

> In the distribution control function, the mass media withhold, selectively distribute, or restructure tension-laden information in order to maintain the system. ... In Cuba, announcements of favorable production figures, government decrees, speeches by the leadership, schedules of cultural activities, and other information intended for routine consumption (rather than to stimulate social reaction) serve a distribution control function.[6]

He noted that all mass media in all environments appear to perform both functions to help maintain their own social system. He added: "The extent to which the media perform those functions

depends on a variety of political, economic, and social conditions in the system."[7]

In his study of several Cuban publications in 1970, 1975 and 1980, Nichols hypothesized that different levels of social conflict and different degrees of social differentiation were expected to have occurred. That is what he found. He wrote:

> The data yield limited support to the conclusion that the feedback control function in the mass media is related to the structural conditions in the Cuban social system. The Cuban print media has set different agendas in some content areas (particularly geographic emphasis), and these agendas tend to vary in relation to the degree of social differentiation and in inverse relation to the level of social conflict. The data contradict the conventional wisdom that the Cuban press is monolithic in content and functions and strongly indicate that substantial changes have occurred in the Cuban media between 1970 and 1980. In sum, Cuban publications serve different functions for different readers at different times.[8]

Nichols, then, found that "... the Cuban press is not a monolith responding solely to the ideological dictates of a single ruler."[9] As Nichols suggested, media content and functions change over time. Phillips Davison noted about the necessity for change in media content:

> Regardless of the manner in which channels are operated or controlled, they must perform a number of

> sociopolitical functions if the society in which they are located is to survive... . For a channel to exist it must be able to provide a service to the society; and if social needs change then the structure and/or content of the channel also will change.[10]

Media are important vehicles for international political communication, which has been defined as "the use by nation states of communications to influence the politically relevant behavior of people in other nation states."[11] That the study of press coverage of a major international issue area would be fruitful was noted by Davison, who stated three purposes of a channel when its content is aimed at an external audience:

> Some international channels are used mainly by governments to further national purposes. ... At least three major purposes are served: to promote tourism, trade, and investment; to keep in touch with national minorities or ideological sympathizers abroad; and to present government positions on major international issues. ...[12]

An important medium for Cuba's international political communication is Granma Weekly Review, which is an official publication of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee. Edward Gonzalez wrote that "... the irregularly convened Central Committee apparently served more as a vehicle for the collective ratification of the fidelista line than as a deliberative organ for hammering out policy."[13] It would be expected to be an official source of Cuban government viewpoints not only because

it is published by the Central Committee, but also because of the role of press in all communist countries. Davison stated that "... the communist media are concentrated to a far greater extent on advancing purposes defined by the party and the state."[14]

What researchers have found out about Soviet Communist Party newspapers Pravda and Izvestia might be useful in understanding the role of Granma. John Spicer Nichols said that Granma daily's daily edition "... is remarkably similar to Pravda, with the exception that it is slightly more flamboyant in its use of color and special graphics."[15] Robert Axelrod and William Zimmerman found that the

> ... Soviet leadership is ... careful about what appears in Pravda and Izvestia on Soviet foreign policy. The attention to words often results in a highly ambiguous style of discourse. It is an ambiguity that derives not from careless disregard for the facts, but that is carefully formulated. ... (T)he formulations employed to describe Soviet policy rarely represent direct deceptions.[16]

That Cuban media have as important a role in furthering Cuban policy is evident in the research of Nichols, who stated that since 1959 two factors have influenced Cuban media:

> First, mass communication is not only important to the Revolution, but Castro considers it to be the very soul of the process. Second, mass communication in a revolution must be flexible, able to adjust to changing circumstances. Accordingly, as the Cuban

> Revolution zigzagged through several phases during the past two decades, so to has the role of the Cuban media frequently changed.[17]

Another reason for the similarity of the Cuban media to government policy was noted by Nichols, who found that 71 percent (32) of the media policy-makers in Cuba had at least one position of signficance within the power structure. Nichols stated that

> ... the cooperation of the channel subsystem by the source subsystem is so complete that it may be said that, whereas Marxist-Leninist theory dictates that communicators must be servants of the state, Cuban media policy-makers and, to large degree, practitioners, are not only servants of the state, they <u>are</u> the state.[18]

Nichols also noted what Castro himself said about the role of the Cuban mass media: "We have a goal, a program, an objective to fulfill, and that objective essentially controls the activity of the journalists."[19]

<u>The Status of U.S.-Cuban Relations</u>

Cuba's relationship to the United States is an area of media content that dominates Cuba's international communications since Fidel Castro took power. Castro's almost-30-year-old revolution, which turned Cuba into the first Communist state in the Western Hemisphere, has resulted in continued animosity between the United States and Cuba. The relationship has been marked by harsh words from both sides and military confrontations at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and on the island of Grenada.

Though the possibility of rapprochement between the United

States and Cuba has seemed at times to be within reach, it has not occurred. The U.S. embargo still stands, and strong anti-U.S. invective still comes from Cuba. Cuban scholars and researchers, however, have identified several time periods during which Cuban-United States relations appeared to be improving before deteriorating again. Internal factors, such as Cuban politics or its economy, and external events, such as changes in Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union or in Cuba's involvement with revolutionary movements in Latin America or in Africa, have influenced Cuba's interest in working toward rapprochement. They also have negatively affected the United States' willingness either to respond to possible Cuban overtures or to make its own moves toward reconciliation.

Cuban-United States diplomatic relations ended January 3, 1961, after months of deteriorating relations. U.S.-backed rebel forces landed at the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961, in an attempt to overthrow Castro. The invasion failed, and lengthy negotiations were necessary to free captured rebel forces. In the spring of 1962, President Kennedy embargoed exports to Cuba. Kennedy blockaded Cuba beginning October 22, 1962, because of the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba. The Soviets removed the missiles, resulting in Cuban irritation at their ally. Researchers say Cuban irritation at the Soviet Union had begun to subside by 1963. Edward Gonzalez stated that a new period of harmonious relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union that began in 1963 lasted through 1965.[20] He suggested that a phase of strained relations with the USSR began after 1965 and that Castro

"assumed a more defiant posture" toward the USSR during the 1966-1968 period. That mood of defiance, however, changed in 1968. Gonzalez wrote:

> In mid-1968 when Soviet-Cuban relations were greatly strained and there was growing unrest due to economic shortages, rumors circulated concerning exploratory talks between Havana and Washington. But Fidel responded by quashing those reports and the accommodative tendencies within his regime.[21]

Gonzalez said the Cuban defiance of the Soviet Union ended in August 1968 when Castro, in order to obtain increased Soviet assistance, yielded to Soviet pressure to endorse the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia. The agreement, Gonzalez wrote, was designed to gain Soviet help

> ... to support his ambitious development programs, to overcome lagging economic production and to ease the level of austerity until the expected upturn in the economy in the early 1970s. This was responsible for Fidel's turnabout on August 23, 1968, which in the end would lead to new accommodations between Havana and Moscow.[22]

Because the 1970 harvest failed, Gonzalez said, Castro was not able to regain the independence from Moscow he had given up in 1968. Gonzalez noted that the Soviet-Cuban alliance was further cemented in September 1970, when Cuba gave the Soviets rights for a submarine servicing station in Cienfuegos harbor. Gonzalez

wrote:

> ... Havana itself foreclosed any turn to the United States as a means of lessening its dependent relationship with the Soviets, while Washington gave Cuba virtually no opening for a possible rapprochement throughout the 1960s.[23]

Cole Blasier had a similar conclusion to that of Gonzalez. He wrote:

> In the late 1960s, with the economy in disarray, Cuba's dependence on Soviet oil became more visible than ever; Soviet patience neared its end, and Soviet oil deliveries to the island slowed. His own policies proven faulty, Castro was reminded of Soviet power to punish and reward, and he brought his policies generally in line with Moscow.[24]

During the period of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States was still fighting in Vietnam against communist insurgents supported by the Soviet Union and its allies, such as Cuba. Besides the animosity caused by the Vietnam conflict, any rapprochement with Cuba seemed unlikely because of Castro's personal dislike for President Nixon. Bender wrote:

> ... A partial explanation for the stronger invective from Cuba during the Nixon administration may well have been a question of Castro's animosity against Richard M. Nixon on a personal level. ...
>
> What effect such personal attacks have cannot

be known with any degree of exactness. There are strong indications, however, that Castro's penchant for vituperation and his deliberate baiting of the United States weigh heavily on U.S. official attitudes. The Russians and Chinese say basically the same things, but somehow Castro's insolence grates more sharply on American sensitivities. Therefore, a lowering of the asperity level of Castro rhetoric would seem imperative for the creation of a climate favorable to rapprochement.[25]

The U.S. view of the prospects of rapprochement was equally as negative. Nixon said in November 1972: "There will be no change, no change whatever toward Cuba, unless and until ... Castro changes his policy toward Latin America and the United States."[26]

Following Nixon's resignation because of the Watergate scandal, the relationship between Cuba and the United States improved, and the two countries held secret talks with Cuba in New York City in 1974 and 1975.[27] Carmelo Mesa-Lago wrote about the improved U.S.-Cuban relations in the mid-1970s:

> From late 1974 to the end of 1975, there was a trend toward U.S.-Cuban rapprochement highlighted by direct negotiations between the two countries and the U.S. decision partly to lift the Cuban embargo for subsidiary firms abroad.[28]

Gonzalez also noted improving relations in the mid-1970s. He wrote:

> Most astonishing of all were Havana's moves to normalize relations with Washington despite Fidel Castro's earlier and repeated insistance that his regime would never approach the "imperialist government of the United States." ... These diplomatic ties seemed to signify that the state of mutual hostility and acrimony was coming to an end.[29]

Gonzalez said Castro's move toward rapprochement was the result of his strengthened political power base after 1973, his perception that detente between the United States and the Soviet Union offered Cuba more security, and the feeling that "U.S. imperialism was increasingly weak and defensive as evidenced by the war in Vietnam, Third World Solidarity, and especially the international capitalist crisis of the mid-1970s."[30] William LeoGrande also wrote about the a move toward rapprochement in the mid-1970s:

> During this period Cuba pursued a conciliatory foreign policy which reinforced these developments. ... With the U.S. threat sharply reduced, Cuba began to seriously pursue normalization of relations in hopes of establishing trade relations which would reduce its economic dependence on the USSR.[31]

President Ford halted the talks with Cuba on December 20, 1975, because of Cuban military actions in Angola.[32] Mesa-Lago mentioned several other reasons why the move toward rapprochement was interrupted: Cuba's support of the Popular Movement for the

Liberation of Palestine (MPLA) and the independence movement in Puerto Rico, the U.S. presidential campaign, supposed CIA involvement in the bombing of a Cuban airliner, and Castro's October 15, 1976, repudiation of the 1973 U.S.-Cuban anti-hijacking agreement.[33] Gonzalez noted that two days after Ford's December 20, 1975, decision to cut off discussions because of Cuban action in Angola and Puerto Rico, Castro announced at a Communist Party congress that there would never be relations with the United States if the price was Cuba's abandonment of its "solidarity" with the "anti-imperialistic" movements in the Third World.[34]

Mesa-Lago suggested that halting the talks did not end the Cuban interest in rapprochement, however. He noted:

> An American scholar who interviewed Deputy Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos Rafael Rodrigues in mid-1975 and mid-1976 reached the conclusion that Cuba is prepared to arrive at a realistic settlement. ...[35]

The inauguration of Jimmy Carter in 1977 has been seen to have been another step in the direction of U.S. rapprochement with Cuba. Cole Blasier noted the consequences of Carter's taking over the presidency:

> On becoming president in 1977, Jimmy Carter moved promptly to resume dialogue with Cuba. Officials of the two countries met in March 1977 to discuss a fishing agreement, signed not long thereafter. During these discussions, negotiations

also began on establishing "interest sections" in the two capitals.[36]

Cuba made some concessions, Blasier noted, such as releasing some political prisoners and announcing withdrawal of some troops from Angola. Blasier said that several major issues remained from the U.S. point of view, however -- Cuba's Soviet ties, its claims on American property, Cuban troops in Africa, and human rights in Cuba. He said the Cubans still sought an end to the trade embargo and the return of the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo.[37]

In an article written in the mid-1980s, Jorge Dominguez also said the height of Cuban-U.S. rapprochement was reached in 1977.[38] In an earlier article, he had suggested the same time period but not a particular year. In the earlier article, he wrote:

> In the mid-1960s, the Cuban government was concerned that U.S. foreign policy had taken a virulently aggressive turn. ... But in the late 1970s, the Dominican invasion has faded in the past. The U.S. is out of Vietnam. ...
>
> ... U.S. military forces are no longer poised to pounce on Cuba, and this fact reflects the basic policy judgment that a military confrontation in the Caribbean, with Cuba or the Soviet Union, has become highly unlikely. Cuba, in turn, has derived security from this judgment.[39]

Blasier said late 1977 was the beginning of the end of the Carter period of Cuban-U.S. cooperation because of increased

Cuban military actions in Africa. He wrote:

> U.S.-Cuban rapprochement seemed to be well underway when news that Cuban troops were intervening in the war between Ethiopia and Somalia was made public in November 1977. The rest of the Carter administration was punctured with one alarming Cuban incident after another, making further rapprochement impossible.[40]

Blasier noted such events as the May 1978 invasion of Zaire by Katanganese troops from the region of Shaba with the alleged assistance of Cuba, the 1978 delivery of Soviet MIG 23s to Cuba, and the summer 1979 discovery of a Soviet brigade in Cuba. The boatlift in the spring and summer of 1980 of 12,500 Cubans, including many with criminal or psychiatric records, from the port of Mariel was the source of additional friction. Carmelo Mesa-Lago stated that a rift emerged when Cuba demanded a total lifting of the U.S. embargo. The United States, instead, wanted Cuba to make the next step toward reconciliation. The improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations ended in 1978, he said, with Cuba's intervention in the Ethiopian-Somali War.[41]

Cuban-U.S. relations did not appear to have improved with the passing of the Carter administration and the beginning of the hard-lined Reagan administration. Pamela Falk stated that by the time of Ronald Reagan's inauguration in January 1981 "Cuban-U.S. relations did not have a hope of improving."[42] As Blasier put it:

> The Reagan administration's global policies, and most particularly its policies toward Central

America and Castro's support for revolutionary movements in the region, caused tensions to mount between Washington and Havana.[43]

Blasier said that, except for meetings between Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig and an agreement on Cuban emigration, little contact took place. He added:

> ... The Reagan administration, through its first term and into the beginning of the second, escalated the long established policy of hostility toward Cuba, the essential aim of which was to promote Castro's fall from power, or failing that, punish him as much as possible. ...[44]

Carla Anne Robbins, however, gave more importance to Cuban-United States contacts in the early 1980s. She noted that the Cubans were showing signs of wanting another attempt at rapprochement in 1982. She wrote:

> In late March 1982, senior Cuban officials began to express publicly a strong interest in improving relations with the Reagan Administration and to finding a solution to the conflict in El Salvador based on negotiations and the exercise of `mutual restraint.'...
>
> ... This was also the first time in twenty years that Cuba had publicly expressed its willingness to negotiate with the United States without any preconditions, such as first normalizing

relations or lifting the economic embargo.[45]

Events in late 1983 seemed to end any thoughts of rapprochement. Castro's personal attacks on Reagan in a 26th of July speech resulted in the head of the U.S. interest section walking out, and in October U.S. forces invaded the island of Grenada and fought Cuban construction workers building an airport there. By the middle of 1984, however, better relations were evident. Negotiations on immigration were begun between the United States and Cuba in July 1984 with a final agreement being made late in the year. The establishment in the spring of 1985 of Radio Marti, an anti-Castro station supported by official U.S. funds, caused further tension and, as Falk noted, negotiations were ended by Cuba when the United States began the broadcasts.[46]

The literature, then, suggests several possible periods when lessened tension between the United States and Cuba might have taken place--something that could be expected to have been reflected in Castro's speeches and in the Cuban press. To summarize the findings, researchers noted that, after the deterioration of relations at the end of the Eisenhower administration and the beginning of the Kennedy administration, not much progress toward rapprochement took place. Gonzales, however, suggested that Castro was more defiant of the Soviet Union during the 1966-67 period and into 1968, suggesting a possible lessening of Cuba's animosity toward the United States. Both Blasier and Gonzalez noted that Cuba yielded in August 1968 to Soviet pressure and strengthened its ties with the USSR.

Several scholars noted the importance of the secret talks of 1974-1975, which were halted at the end of 1975. Mesa-Lago noted, however, that Cuba was still desirous for a settlement with the United States in mid-1976.

The literature consulted suggests the positive impact on Cuban-U.S. relations of the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976. Various researchers selected the mid-1970s, the year 1977 and the period of the late 1970s as high points in Cuban-U.S. relations. Mesa-Lago suggested 1978 as the end of that period of conciliation, while Blasier noted that deterioration of relations began in November 1977 and continued through the summer of 1980. The election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980 was seen as having a negative impact on Cuban-U.S. relations. Robbins, however, noted Cuba showed a strong interest in improving relations again in the spring of 1982. By mid-1983 relations apparently were at another low point, which the invasion of Grenada in October 1983 did nothing to improve. However, by the summer of 1984 it appeared that relations had improved, as shown by the beginning of negotiations on immigration that continued that fall.

Drawing from the literature, it is possible to construct a hypothetical time line for measuring Cuban-U.S. relations until mid-1984. It would show that, following poor relations beginning when Castro nationalized U.S. holdings, the two countries had periods of improved relations from 1966 to early 1968, during the 1974-1977 period, and in 1982. Any such chronology, however, can be expected to leave gaps and uncertainty at some points as to exactly when deterioration or improvement of relations begin and

how long they continued. Some years, such as 1968 and 1983, were seen to be turning points and should be expected to show both tendencies. Relations also appeared to deteriorate at points during 1975 and 1976. Imprecision in determining periods of lessened U.S.-Cuban hostility results from researchers' use of different conceptions of such terms as "rapprochement" and "reconciliation" as well as their use of different standards upon which to base their conclusions. Some researchers looked at the relationship between the two countries from a U.S. perspective and others from a Cuban one. There is considerable evidence, however, that periods of closer relations did exist during those time frames.

Castro's Attitude Toward the United States

Any attempt to quantify the extent of changes in Cuba's attitude toward the United States requires a decision as to a definition of Cuban policy. Fidel Castro has been the Cuban leader over the complete time frame studied. That Castro's policy is Cuban policy is suggested in the literature. About the role of Castro in promoting Cuban policy, Lynn Darrell Bender wrote that

> ... at the heart of the regime remains the charismatic appeal of Fidel Castro. This appeal cements public support for policy decisions which are a product of an unsystematic but highly pragmatic intercourse between the elements that make up the leadership group. ...[47]

In further describing that role, Edward Gonzalez wrote:

> Uppermost among the roles has been Fidel's

function as the primary generator of mass loyalty. ... As the regime's spokesman for communicating policy, moreover, he has become the principle agent for galvanizing public opinion behind the regime's policies. ... In short, the network of mass organizations has provided the organizational means for mobilizing society, but Fidel has supplied the impulse and motivation for mobilization.[48]

Gonzalez wrote that Castro also has an important role in policy-making:

> ... The bureaucracy, the mass organization, and the party apparatus were designed to organize, discipline, and mobilize society from above and, simultaneously, to give free rein to Fidel's own individualistic style of governance. Hence, key organs of power and decision-making came to be controlled directly by him or indirectly through his personally loyal appointees. Institution-building ... tended to perpetuate a virtual system of anarcho-fidelismo within the Cuban regime.
>
> In effect, Fidel's personal preeminence allowed him to bypass institutional channels for decision making in the determination of policy and the selling of revolution goals. ...[49]

Granma Weekly Review provides the Cuban government with a medium for transmitting Castro's statements to the world. Many of those comments concern Cuba's relationship with the United

States. A review was made of statements by Castro printed in Granma from the 1966, when Granma began, to mid-1984, which appeared to be the beginning of a period of visibly improved relations between the two countries. Throughout that period, Castro has blamed the United States for hostility between the two countries. He said U.S. hostility began with the May 17, 1959, Agrarian Reform Law, which broke up the holdings of U.S. companies in Cuba. Prior to the advent of Granma, Castro had set forth his viewpoint about the United States in a December 2, 1961, speech in which he announced that he had become a Marxist-Leninist. He said at that time:

> ... Any country which resolves to liberate itself from the monopoly of North American trade, which determines to make an Agrarian Reform, which decides to have its own industries, to have its own independent policy, has to oppose imperialism.[50]

As late as a speech in May 1973, Castro was saying the prospect for improved relations were based on the United States' actions:

> We clearly state that we won't discuss anything with the United States as long as the blockade exists. And if, someday, it wants to discuss things with us, it'll first have to end the blockade unconditionally. There will be no improvement in the relations between Cuba and the United States as long as the United States keeps trying to impose its sovereignty

over Latin America, as long as it keeps trying to play the role of gendarme over our sister nations in this part of the world. That, to us, is the main problem.[51]

When conditions improved in the mid-1970s with Nixon's leaving office, talks were held and interests offices were established. With the election of Jimmy Carter as U.S. President, Castro suggested that closer relations were possible. He still was saying, however, that it was up to the United States to remove obstacles to reconciliation. As to when negotiations would occur, he told journalist Barbara Walters in July 1977:

> I can say for certainty that, for our part, we are willing to work in that direction and that we will be responsive to the United States' will in that respect. However, even from an optimistic standpoint, I don't think that relations will be reestablished in the near future; in fact, not even in Carter's present term of office. Maybe in the second, between 1980 and 1984 -- or perhaps even later. I believe Carter would have to remove internal obstacles in order to change his policy.[52]

Conditions deteriorated later in Carter's presidency, and Ronald Reagan's election to the U.S. presidency seem to ensure no reconciliation would take place. However, in a July 26, 1984, speech following a visit by Democratic Party presidential candidate Jesse Jackson--in spite of Castro's castigation of the

United States for its aggressiveness--Castro noted that talks had begun again between the two countries.

> ... As a result of that visit, and on the basis of a bipartisan consensus in the United States, talks have started between representatives of the Cuban and U.S. governments in New York on matters of migration and other related questions of interest to both sides.
>
> We are ready to continue these talks in a serious manner, with the gravity, maturity, valor and sense of responsibility that are characteristic of our Revolution. ...[53]

A study of Castro's statements printed in Granma Weekly Review since 1966 suggested several general conclusions about his public attitude toward the United States. First, Castro blames the United States for overreacting to Cuban policies and for being the source of aggressive actions against Cuba. Second, Castro's attitude toward the United States also has undergone changes. He made statements suggesting his desire for improved relations with the United States at least as early as 1973 and seemed to continue to want improved relations. Lynn Darrell Bender noted about the degree of consistency in Castro's policy:

> Given the impediments inherent in attempting to carry out a thoroughgoing socialist revolution in an underdeveloped country whose economy and political structure had previously been closely bound to a close and powerful neighbor, it is

> hardly surprising that Castro's policies, both internal and external, have vacillated radically. Nonetheless, in terms of the goals toward which Cuban policy has been directed, they show considerable consistency. ... Thus Cuban policy has been directed toward (1) attaining security against American opposition and (2) maintaining support for the regime and its goals through vigorous and uncompromising development efforts.[54]

Though Castro's preconditions for negotiations have not change appreciably, his distinction between talks and negotiations allowed him to hold discussions with the United States without having to bend on what he said were the basic principles to be met before negotiations could be held. He continued to argue that he could not be expected to break his ties with the Soviet Union or end assistance to revolutionary movements in order to achieve reconciliation. Cole Blasier noted that Castro's preconditions to reconciliation seemed to preclude reconciliation because the United States has been equally faithful to its long-time policy toward a Communist Cuba. He wrote:

> (T)he United States has continued essentially the same hostile and punitive policies: blocking any initiatives from which Castro might benefit irrespective of costs born by, or opportunities lost to, the United States. ...[55]

A reason why it may be necessary for Cuba to refrain from closer relations with the United States was suggested by Carmelo Mesa-Lago:

> ... (E)conomic, social and cultural ties with the United States, unless closely controlled, could pose a subversive threat to Cuba's revolutionary society. Most importantly, the very structure and logic of Cuba's international position may force it to maintain its distance from the United States.[56]

Whether Castro wanted complete reconciliation or not, his remarks suggest that he was seeking better relations with the United States by the early 1970s, that he was optimistic about rapprochement in 1977 and that his statements favoring better ties with the United States continued into the early 1980s despite disagreements with the Carter and Reagan administrations. Thus, the hypothesis that there has been a change in Castro's attitude toward the United States is supported by his statements.

Methodology

The work of researchers and Castro's statements have suggested a similar theme -- that Cuba's policy toward the United States has been more conciliatory toward the United States at various times. This paper will try to answer three general questions about Cuba's policy toward the United States and the role on Granma Weekly Review in reflecting that policy. First, has the attitude toward the United States as seen in Castro's speeches and in Granma changed over the years? Second, have

changes in the content of Granma referring to the United States reflected the changes in content of Castro's speeches. Third, have the changes in Cuban attitude toward the United States as observed by researchers been reflected in the content of Castro's speeches and the content of Granma? Answering those questions would help in understanding the role of Granma Weekly Review in as an instrument of international political communication.

The measurement of symbol usage has been useful in measuring changes of content of communications. Writings of Harold Lasswell suggest the importance of symbols in political communication. Lasswell in an article first published in 1949 described a key symbol as "a basic term of the political myth."[57] He defined a political myth as "the symbols invoked to justify specific power practices."[58] He wrote about such symbols:

> One obvious function performed by the key symbol is that of providing a common experience for everyone in the state, ranging from the most powerful boss to the humblest layman or philosopher. ... Sentiments of loyalty cluster around these terms, and contribute to the unity of the commonwealth.[59]

Lasswell wrote that behavior during crises and on the part of despotic leaders has something in common because "language is employed as missile and shield in both cases." He added:

> ... We expect the concentration of instrumentalities to be greatest in the direction from which the gravest threat is known or

anticipated. In this way, symbols and signs are employed as instruments of power to nullify the threat value of the environment, enhancing both security and the affirmative projection of power.[60]

The greatest threat to Cuba, of course, is the United States, and change over time in usage of symbols referring to the United States should be useful in indicating how that threat is perceived. For the present study, symbols referring to the United States were counted and categorized. A list of the 100 most-frequently used words or word groups (e.g., Secretary of State, Department of Defense) found in Granma during the study period was compiled. The study period was from 1966 until July 1984. The year 1966 was chosen because that was the year Granma was begun. Mid-1984 was chosen because it was the obvious beginning of an important period of discussions between the United States and Cuba, one that led to an agreement on Cuban emigres, and was a break in a period of discord between the two countries.

One issue of Granma each month was selected randomly for analysis. A page number was picked randomly, and that page was scanned for a reference to the United States. If no mention was noted, another page was randomly chosen. If no mention was found in an issue, another issue from the same month was selected randomly. When a reference was found, the entire page was the context unit, and any word on the page referring to the United States was noted. Since many stories mentioned the United States

but were not "about" the United States overall, no count was made of story lengths, for it would be an arbitrary measure. No differentiation was made between type of stories (i.e., news, feature, or editorial), because the author was interested in the contents of the entire newspaper, not just a particular type of article. Moreover, there were few editorials as such. Most stories with references to the United States were news stories.

The 100 words or word groups (hereafter referred to as symbols) referring to the United States most frequently mentioned in Granma are listed in Table I. A total of 9,997 mentions of those 100 symbols were found in the sample of all editions of Granma during the study period. Those 100 symbols were placed into one of five categories that seemed best to reflect their nature: aggressive words, ideological words, people, locations, and organizations. They are categorized in Table II. Of the 100 symbols, three judges agreed on the placement of an average of 86. Overall, judges agreed on the placement of 92.3 percent of the 9,997 total mentions. Of the 1,175 mentions of the 27 symbols in the aggressive category, judges agreed on 1,086, a 92.4 percent agreement rate. Of the 1,833 mentions of the 23 ideological symbols, judges agreed upon 1,767, an agreement rate of 96.4 percent. Overall for the aggressive and ideological categories, the two categories seen as most important to the study, judges placed 94.8 percent of symbols in the expected category. Most the disagreement over placement was over whether a symbol was ideological or aggressive. Seventy-eight percent of the ideological symbols about which there was disagreement were

placed in the aggressive category instead. The level of agreement was considered sufficient for the categories to be meaningful. Since the categories remained consistent over the time period, analysis would indicate how usage of words in the categories changed during that time.

Each speech of Castro's that was at least half a printed page of Granma, a broadsheet (full-sized) newspaper, also was scanned for references to the United States. For the analysis, one column from each speech was randomly selected. If no reference to the United States was found, columns were selected randomly until a column with references to the United States was found. If no references were found, a zero was posted. All words referring to the United States were compared to the list of the 100 most-frequently used symbols found in Granma during the study period. A reference to any symbols on the list was counted.

McQuitty's Elementary Linkage Analysis was used to determine which years had the "best fit" with other years because of the frequency of usage of words in each category.[61] Its utility for trend analysis was proposed by both Fred Kerlinger[62] and Malcolm MacLean.[63] Linkage analysis results in clusters of like items. Kerlinger said of clusters:

> A cluster is a subset of a set of "objects" -- persons, tests, concepts, and so on -- the members of which are more similar or closer to each other than they are to members outside the cluster. The key question is how to define and identify clusters and their members. ...[64]

"Objects" falling into the cluster tend to be alike in the aspects being investigated -- in this case, years as to their frequencies of symbols in various categories. Clusters were determined through linkage of the factor scores in the O factor analysis matrix. The O score matrix consists of the five categories as the independent variable and the 19 time frames as the dependent variable. The correlation matrix consists of a grid of 19 columns and rows for the 19 years of the study.

Hypotheses

Because of the nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship noted by researchers and apparent in Castro's remarks, it appeared that aggressive words would be most useful symbol category. The frequency of use of aggressive words was expected to be highest in times when the Cuban relationship with the United States was most strained and less when it was more amicable. Based on that assumption and an analysis of researchers' statements on the Cuban-U.S. relationship over the past two decades, the first hypothesis was constructed:

Hypothesis 1: Low points in the frequency of aggressive symbols in Castro's speeches and in Granma should be found in the 1966-67 period, 1974 through 1977, and in 1982, when closer relations with the United States were theorized.

Ole Holsti wrote that the similarity of Chinese and Soviet policy could be analyzed by looking at changes in their attitudes toward the United States. He wrote: "Perceptions of the United States should provide a useful and valid index of the level of agreement or disagreement with Chinese and Soviet decision

makers."[65] Holsti's work suggests that perceptions of the United States also should provide a valid index of the level of agreement or disagreement of one country (Cuba) over a time frame. Based on Holsti's findings, it was assumed that the ratio of the frequency of aggressive symbols usage to the frequency of usage of the other symbol categories should be more similar during time periods in which Cuban policy toward the United States was the most similar. Thus:

Hypothesis 2: The frequency of use of symbols in each category in 1966-67, 1974 through 1977, and in 1982 should be more alike and also significantly different from the symbol usage in other periods.

The final hypothesis pertains to the function of Granma Weekly Review based on the finding of John Spicer Nichols that the function that the press performs in Cuba transcends political ideology to some extent. The hypothesis, however, is phrased in the form of a null hypothesis because of the expectation that media content should reflect the views of those who control a particular medium:

Hypothesis 3: The contents of Granma Weekly Review should reflect the contents of Castro's speeches either by containing similar frequencies of symbol usage in particular categories or by varying its use of aggressive symbols in a way that reflects such increases or decreases in Castro's speeches.

Summary of Key Findings

The first hypothesis -- that a decrease in the frequency of aggressive symbol usage would be expected during periods when better relations were theorized -- received moderate support. It did not appear that use of aggressive symbols was at all times during the study period a good determinant of the assumed status of Cuban-U.S. relations. The second hypothesis -- that there would be a similarity in usage of symbols in the five categories during theorized periods of closer relations -- received fairly strong support. The third hypothesis -- that the contents of Granma Weekly Review would reflect Castro's speeches in symbol usage -- was rejected. Because of the difference in symbol usage found in Granma and in Castro's speeches, there were differences in the extent of support given each set of data for the first two hypotheses.

The following is a summary of the main findings about the hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Low points in the frequency of aggressive symbols in Castro's speeches and in Granma should be found in the 1966-67 period, 1974 through 1977, and in 1982, when closer relations with the United States were theorized.

Castro Data

(Table III)

(1) Five of the seven years of the hypothesis were above the median for frequency of symbols usage, suggesting more interest in the United States at those times.

(2) Only three years mentioned in the hypothesis were below

the median for frequency of aggressive symbols and one at the median, and none of the five years with the lowest frequency of aggressive symbols was a year listed in the hypothesis, which does not give much support to the hypothesis.

(Table IV)

(3) Six of the seven years mentioned in the hypothesis were above the median for frequency of usage of ideological symbols; thus, the years in the hypothesis were more similar in use of ideological than aggressive symbols.

Granma Data

(Table V)

(1) Three of the seven years of the hypothesis were above the median for number of symbols, which suggests more interest in the United States at those times, but four were among the lowest five.

(2) Only four of the seven years in the hypothesis were below the median in frequency of use of aggressive symbols, and three years not in the hypothesis were ranked among the four years with the fewest aggressive symbols, which gives only limited support to the hypothesis.

(3) The frequency of use of aggressive symbols was low in the mid-1970s and in 1982, as hypothesized; however, it was high in the 1966-67 period and fell significantly in 1970 and 1971.

(Table VI)

(4) Four of the hypothesis years were above the median, one at the median and two below; so ideological symbol usage was not as good an indicator of similarities among the years in the

hypothesis in the Granma data as it was in the Castro data, but it was about as good an indicator as was aggressive symbol usage.

Thus, although the Granma data tended to give more support than did the Castro data, the hypothesis was not strongly supported overall. The lower level of aggressive symbol usage in Granma in the 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1982 provided the strongest support for the hypothesis. However, the low levels of 1971, 1973, and 1979 were unexpected. In Castro's speeches, no hypothesis year was among the five years with the lowest frequencies of aggressive symbols.

Hypothesis 2: The frequency of use of symbols in each category during the 1966-67 period, 1974 through 1977, and in 1982 should be more alike and also significantly different from the symbol usage in other periods.

Castro Data

(Figures 1, 2, 3, 4)

(1) All of the hypothesis years were in the same clusters (Cluster III), which supports the hypothesis.

Granma Data

(Figures 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)

(1) The years in the hypothesis were in three different clusters: one cluster with only hypothesis years (1966, 1967, and 1974), one with a hypothesis year (1982) and a transitional year (1983), and one with only hypothesis years and the years immediately following (1975-1980) -- thus giving limited support to the hypothesis.

Therefore, the Castro data strongly supported the second

hypothesis, and the Granma data gave slightly less support.

Hypothesis 3: The contents of Granma Weekly Review should reflect the contents of Castro's speeches either by containing similar frequencies of symbol usage in particular categories or by varying its use of aggressive symbols in a way that reflects such increases or decreases in Castro's speeches.

The major findings on the third hypothesis:

(1) There was a low correlation overall between the frequencies of symbol usage in the Castro and Granma data over the years of the study. (Pearson R=.265)

(2) The two sets of data were dissimilar in their use of symbols in all categories, being most dissimilar in ideological symbol usage (C=.195) and most alike for use of people symbols (C=.081). Other C scores: organizations, .092; aggressive symbols, C=.111; and for locations, .151. (The higher the C score, the more unalike)

(3) Five of the hypothesis years were among the nine years that were most dissimilar as to frequency of symbols usage in the Castro and Granma data. (Table VI)

(4) In all but three years of the study, Castro used a higher frequency of aggressive symbols than did Granma, with all of those years in which Granma had a higher frequency of aggressive symbols occurring before 1971; except for transitional year 1968, the greatest difference in the two sets of data occurred in years after 1974.

(5) In every year of the study Castro used a higher frequency of ideological symbols than did Granma.

(6) 1968 and 1983 -- the "transitional years" between periods when Cuban-U.S. relations were thought to be significantly different -- were the two years that were most unlike the years surrounding them as to difference between Granma's and Castro's frequency of use of aggressive symbols.

(7) 1969 and 1982 were the years which were most unlike the years surrounding them as to difference in Granma's and Castro's frequency of use of ideological symbols.

(8) 1969 and 1983 were the years in which Castro's and Granma's use of symbols in all categories was most similar.

(9) 1977 and 1982 were the two years in which Castro's and Granma's use of symbols was most dissimilar overall.

(10) 1977, the year with the most ideological symbols in Castro's speeches, was also the year with the greatest difference between Castro's speeches and Granma as to frequency of ideological symbols.

Discussion and Conclusions

Why was use of aggressive symbols in Castro's speeches not a always a good indicator of the assumed status of Cuban-U.S. relations? The content of Castro's speeches was consistently aggressive toward the United States, even when talks were under way and Castro was making statements in other forums that were more favor toward the United States. For example, in the 1977 interview cited earlier, Castro said that Carter was the best president in 16 years; however, 1977 was ranked fifth in terms of Castro's frequency of use of aggressive symbols. Use of aggressive symbols was most likely a part of posturing. The frequency of use

of aggressive symbols in Granma was a better indicator than Castro's speeches of the assumed status of Cuban-U.S. relations. There seem to be obvious reasons for the high frequency of aggressive symbols in 1966 and 1967 -- when Castro was thought to be reconsidering Cuba's relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the Vietnam War was in progress, and it might be expected that Granma would continue to project an anti-U.S. position even if Cuba's relations with the United States were better than in previous years. Cuba has long supported revolutionary movements, and it would be expected that the Cuban press would follow the "party line" and continue to use a high frequency of aggressive symbols aimed at the United States at times of conflict.

A more difficult question to answer is why Granma had a lower frequency of use of aggressive symbols in 1971, 1973, and 1979 than in years in the hypothesis and why Castro's speeches had a lower frequency of use of aggressive symbols in 1968, 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1973 than in years in the hypothesis. The reduced frequency of aggressive symbols in 1968 and the early 1970s might be a reaction to what was going on in the United States. 1968 was an election year during which peace in Vietnam was a major issue, and that may have influenced Castro to decrease the anti-U.S. rhetoric. During the early 1970s, Vietnam peace discussions were taking place, which may have had an effect on both the content of Castro's speeches and of Granma. Aggressive symbol usage increased in 1974 to the highest point since 1969. As Carmelo Mesa-Lago noted, it was not until late 1974 that the trend toward

rapprochement during the mid-1970 period began. The low level in 1979 is interesting. Despite Castro's disagreements with Jimmy Carter, Granma had not become any more aggressive toward the United States. There was not a particularly high level of aggressive language in Granma from 1975 until 1983, the year of the U.S. invasion of Grenada. The election of Ronald Reagan did not lead to a dramatic increase in the relatively low frequency of aggressive symbols that began in the early 1970s. It took another conflict -- Grenada -- to do that.

The comparison of frequency of use of symbols in all categories appeared to be the best indicator of changes in Castro's and Granma's attitude toward the United States. That all the years contained in the hypothesis were part of the same cluster in the Castro data both supports the theorizing of researchers on Cuban-U.S. relations and also suggests that the symbol content of Castro's speeches in all five categories is a good indicator of changes of Cuba's policy toward the United States. Though the clusters of years in the Granma data were somewhat different, they were quite similar to what was hypothesized.

We can tell what similarities exist between years in a cluster by comparing symbol frequency. It was expected that frequency of aggressive symbols would be the major factor. That there was a statistically significant difference at the .01 level between all clusters in the Granma data and between all clusters in the Castro data as to use of aggressive symbols, suggests that frequency of aggressive symbol usage is important

in understanding why years fell into certain clusters. There was some difference in cluster homogeneity, however. All the clusters of the Castro data were homogeneous for use of aggressive symbols; however, none of five Granma clusters was. Three of the four Castro clusters were homogeneous for use of ideological symbols, as were four of the five Granma clusters. However, only two years of the Castro data and only three years in the Granma data had a statistically significant difference from the cluster mean for ideological usage. Thus, ideological usage was the best single measure as to why years were in which clusters in the Granma data, while use of aggressive symbols was the best single measure in the Castro data, though ideological symbol usage was not a bad measure. That knowledge could be useful in analyzing further data.

Comparisons of the differences in frequencies of aggressive words in Castro's speeches and the contents of Granma also appear useful in understanding the role of Granma. Castro's speeches were more aggressive except for three years -- 1967, 1968, and 1970. One unanswered question is why 1968 and 1983 were so unalike surrounding years as to the difference in frequency of aggressive language in the Castro and Granma data. It is not explained by the fact that they were transitional years. In 1968 Castro's speeches had a substantially lower aggressive symbol frequency than the years before and the following year while Granma had a somewhat higher frequency than for any year in the study period. The reason may have been tied to rapprochement with the Soviet Union later that year, but the reason is not

totally clear. In 1983 Granma had a considerably higher aggressive symbol frequency, while Castro's aggressive symbol frequency dropped slightly. The reason for the increase in Granma was no doubt because of the invasion of Grenada. It is interesting that Castro's speeches did not reflect that change and showed a more measured response.

Castro's symbol usage was similar to Granma's early in the study period but considerably different in later years. The use of aggressive symbols was quite similar through 1975, except for 1968, and quite different after that point, except for 1983. Surprisingly, Castro's speeches after 1974 became more aggressive and Granma less aggressive. Granma seemed to be presenting not only the less-aggressive message hypothesized for the mid-1970s, but it continued with that message beyond the time that it was expected to end. We can assume that it was purposive because of the nature of communist media. It also is similar to what was seen in interviews Castro gave after 1974. His speeches presented a more-aggressive anti-United States stance than did his interviews with the foreign press.

Because there was such a low correlation between Granma's and Castro's use of the key symbols, the data give support to John Nichols' finding that Cuban media do not follow the dictates of a single ruler. However, it is somewhat difficult to determine from the public record what those dictates were. Castro's symbol usage was different from Granma's and apparently different from the message he was giving in interviews with the foreign press. One reason is that Granma and Castro's interviews with the

international press are aimed at a different audience than are Castro's speeches, which are aimed at an internal audience instead of an external one. All are designed to further the aims of the revolution, however. Nichols stated about Castro's use of the media to carry his policies to the people:

> ... Castro and his lieutenants knew that the success of their revolution depended on their ability to integrate disparate sectors of the Cuban society and collectively mobilize them behind goals of the communist Revolution. The mass media became prime tools in this process. And although Castro's public appearances and television addresses are less frequent today, the importance of the media has not diminished but is actually greater because it serves additional functions for the maturing Cuban Revolution.[66]

Castro's goal of using his speeches to mobilize the support of the Cuban people also is shown in a 1977 interview with television journalist Barbara Walters. When Walters asked Castro about the response given by his audiences when he attacked the United States and why he used the slogan "Hit the Yankees hard," Castro responded:

> An old slogan that has persisted for all these years. ... (T)he United States acts as an enemy of Cuba and the United States maintains a severe economic blockade. They know this. These are slogans. Often, in many public meetings, these are slogans

that catch on and then are repeated.[67]

Granma and Castro do send a different message to their audiences; however, Castro sends different messages. Granma does not appear to be following Fidel Castro's pronouncements in his speeches in the issue area presented here. The two messages are not at odds, however. Granma is a political newspaper closely tied to the government and presents the official party line, but it attempts to provide information on a wide range of subjects to an international audience. Castro may be considering the impact of his speeches on the outside world, but he is aiming them as the citizens of Cuba. His audience wants and expects him to attack the United States verbally, which is why the level of aggressive symbols in his speeches remained higher than Granma's throughout nearly all of the study period.

From the review of interviews of Castro and other statements, it is evident that for a long period of time he has sought to overcome some of the hostility between his country and the United States. His agreements with the Reagan administration in late 1984 and late 1987 indicate that he is willing to negotiate while continuing his attacks on the United States. When Castro states his conditions for peace, his words might well be given some consideration as a reflection of his thinking, because it seems apparent that Castro has been consistent in his statements concerning his desire for serious negotiation. As researchers have suggested, however, total rapprochement may not be desirable from the Cuban perspective and may not be possible because of the United States' dislike of the communist government.

The main findings of the study seem useful in understanding Cuba's external communications. Contrary to the hypothesis, it was found that changes in the use of aggressive symbols in Castro's speeches did not relate closely to changes that would have been expected based on what was thought to be Cuban policy at the time. Findings suggest that the message Castro presents in his speeches is more complex. While the level of aggressive language contained in his speeches does not seem consistent with the message he is sending to the world community through interviews and other statements, symbol usage in his speeches still reflects the apparent Cuban policy. That is indicated by the support given the second hypothesis because of the similar symbol usage found in Castro's speeches during years researchers thought to be periods of closer relations between the United States and Cuba. The third hypothesis, that frequency of symbol usage in Granma overall was similar to that found in Castro's speeches, was not proved. That lends support to John Nichols' finding that Cuban media do not follow the dictates of a single person. More importantly, however, it was found that the symbol content of Granma appeared to have changed after 1974, the beginning of a long period during which Cuba's policy toward the United States was thought to have become more conciliatory. Before that point, Gr na and Castro's speeches were similar in their use of aggressive symbols. Since then, the use of aggressive symbols in Granma has been a better indicator of Cuban policy. Thus, even though Castro's speeches and the contents of Granma seem to be sending different messages, they both seem to

reflect a Cuban policy--one that has been more conciliatory toward the United States since the mid-1970s.

Questions remain about the role of Granma and Castro's speeches in furthering Cuban policy, but both seem to be useful instruments for Cuba to further its domestic and foreign policy goals. As researchers have found, Cuba's policies have changed, but its goals have not. Much more can be learned about the role of Granma as well as other Cuban communications in this and other policy areas; however, this study possibly has suggested directions such future study could take.

TABLE I

FREQUENCY OF THE 100 MOST-USED WORDS IN GRANMA REFERRING TO THE UNITED STATES

| Word | Frequency | Word | Frequency |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 3,322 | army | 30 |
| imperialism | 1,046 | oppression | 30 |
| Yankees | 711 | provocation | 29 |
| Puerto Rico | 419 | murder | 28 |
| aggression | 368 | Guantanamo Navy Base | 28 |
| CIA | 341 | Secretary of State | 26 |
| Reagan | 205 | Inter-American Police Force | 25 |
| Nixon | 152 | America | 25 |
| blacks/Negroes | 149 | embassy | 24 |
| OAS | 140 | sabotage | 24 |
| Panama Canal | 128 | bourgeois | 24 |
| criminal | 127 | bomber | 23 |
| Washington | 107 | air force | 23 |
| capitalism | 102 | forces | 22 |
| Carter | 96 | Senate | 22 |
| intervention | 93 | violent | 21 |
| monopoly | 92 | press | 21 |
| Giron/Bay of Pigs | 84 | espionage | 21 |
| troops | 78 | repression | 21 |
| N. Rockefeller | 72 | lies | 20 |
| administration | 69 | subversion | 20 |
| colonial | 68 | Gulf Oil | 20 |
| planes | 67 | domination | 20 |
| Johnson | 64 | occupation | 20 |
| invasion | 61 | kill | 19 |
| State Department | 60 | advisers | 19 |
| Pentagon | 58 | NATO | 18 |
| military | 55 | massacre | 18 |
| exploitation | 55 | genocide | 18 |
| bases | 52 | Malcolm X | 17 |
| bomb | 49 | FBI | 16 |
| enemy | 49 | ambassador | 16 |
| blockade | 47 | brutality | 16 |
| Haig | 46 | savage | 15 |
| Congress | 42 | ships | 15 |
| attacks | 39 | House | 15 |
| soldiers | 39 | Ford | 15 |
| Navy | 38 | annexation | 14 |
| Marines | 36 | women's rights | 14 |
| companies | 34 | reactionary | 14 |
| Angela Davis | 34 | propaganda | 14 |
| White House | 34 | treaty | 14 |
| racist | 33 | trusts | 14 |
| threat | 32 | | |

TABLE I (Continued)

| Word | Frequency | Word | Frequency |
|---|---|---|---|
| cynicism | 13 | International Monetary Fund | 10 |
| assassination | 13 | Kissinger | 10 |
| Foreign Trade Law | 12 | destruction | 9 |
| hegemony | 11 | warmongers | 8 |
| manuevers | 11 | missiles | 7 |
| slander | 11 | | |
| M.L. King | 11 | | |
| W. Colby | 10 | | 9,997 |

TABLE II

TOP-FREQUENCY WORDS IN GRANMA REFERRING TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRIBUTED BY CATEGORIES

| Ideological | Aggressive | Organizations |
|---|---|---|
| bourgeois | aggression | administration |
| capitalist | annexation | air force |
| colonial | assassination | army |
| criminal | attacks | bases |
| cynicism | blockade | CIA |
| enemy | bomb | companies |
| espionage | bomber | Congress |
| exploitation | brutality | embassy |
| hegemony | destruction | FBI |
| imperialism | domination | Foreign Trade Law |
| lies | forces | Gulf Oil |
| manuevers | genocide | House |
| monopoly | intervention | IMF |
| oppression | invasion | IAPF |
| propaganda | kill | Marines |
| provocation | massacre | military |
| racist | missile | NATO |
| reactionary | murder | navy |
| repression | occupation | OAS |
| slander | planes | Pentagon |
| subversion | sabotage | press |
| warmongers | savage | Senate |
| women's rights | ships | State Dept. |
| Total: 1,833 | soldiers | treaty |
| | threats | trusts |
| | troops | Washington |
| | violent | White House |
| | Total: 1,175 | Total: 1,330 |

| Locations | People | |
|---|---|---|
| America | advisers | Kissinger |
| Panama Canal | ambassador | Malcolm X |
| Giron/Bay of Pigs | blacks/Negroes | Nixon |
| Guantanamo Naval Base | Carter | Reagan |
| Puerto Rico | W. Colby | Rockefeller |
| United States | A. Davis | Secretary of State |
| Total: 4,006 | G. Ford | Yankees |
| | Haig | Total: 1,653 |
| | Johnson | |
| | M.L. King | Grand Total: 9,997 |

TABLE III

RANKING YEARS FOR USE OF AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS IN CASTRO'S SPEECHES

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1984 | .2955 | 1981 | .2020 | 1979 | .1724 | 1973 | .1073 |
| 1980 | .2928 | 1978 | .2018 | 1976 | .1667 | 1968 | .0776 |
| 1969 | .2474 | 1975 | .2013 | 1974 | .1526 | 1970 | .0604 |
| 1982 | .2308 | 1983 | .1967 | 1967 | .1441 | 1971 | .0507 |
| 1977 | .2042 | 1966 | .1875 | 1972 | .1415 | | |

Mean: .1711 Median: 1966

TABLE IV

RANKING YEARS FOR FREQUENCY OF USE OF IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS, CASTRO DATA

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1977 | .6492 | 1973 | .4576 | 1976 | .4127 | 1984 | .2500 |
| 1967 | .5502 | 1982 | .4556 | 1970 | .3960 | 1969 | .2371 |
| 1971 | .5392 | 1968 | .4397 | 1978 | .3421 | 1981 | .2020 |
| 1966 | .5179 | 1975 | .4340 | 1980 | .2818 | 1983 | .1803 |
| 1974 | .4779 | 1972 | .4292 | 1979 | .2759 | | |

Mean: .428 Median: 1972

TABLE V

RANKING YEARS OF GRANMA DATA FOR
USE OF AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1968 | .211 | 1984 | .135 | 1978 | .077 | 1973 | .051 |
| 1967 | .202 | 1974 | .122 | 1981 | .073 | 1982 | .051 |
| 1969 | .196 | 1972 | .106 | 1976 | .063 | 1971 | .040 |
| 1966 | .165 | 1970 | .099 | 1975 | .053 | 1979 | .034 |
| 1983 | .137 | 1980 | .087 | 1977 | .053 | | |

Mean: .104 Median: 1980

TABLE VI

RANKING YEARS BY FREQUENCY OF USE OF
IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS, GRANMA DATA

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1974 | .301 | 1978 | .222 | 1980 | .182 | 1981 | .116 |
| 1967 | .280 | 1975 | .202 | 1977 | .178 | 1984 | .103 |
| 1966 | .235 | 1970 | .198 | 1968 | .175 | 1982 | .056 |
| 1973 | .226 | 1969 | .190 | 1979 | .159 | 1983 | .054 |
| 1972 | .223 | 1976 | .184 | 1971 | .132 | | |

TABLE VII

RANKING YEARS BY C SCORES FOR USE OF SYMBOLS BY CASTRO AND GRANMA

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1969 | .036 | 1981 | .103 | 1973 | .124 | 1975 | .185 |
| 1983 | .094 | 1970 | .106 | 1966 | .128 | 1971 | .187 |
| 1978 | .099 | 1967 | .107 | 1979 | .141 | 1977 | .213 |
| 1984 | .100 | 1974 | .108 | 1980 | .144 | 1982 | .258 |
| 1968 | .102 | 1972 | .110 | 1976 | .156 | | |

| | 68 | 70 | 71 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 68 | ---- | .9726 | .9951 |
| 70 | .9726 | ---- | .9647 |
| 71 | .9951 | .9647 | ---- |
| | 1.9677 | 1.8907 | 1.9598 |

Figure 1. O Data Matrix for Cluster I Years, Castro Data

| | 72 | 73 | 78 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 72 | ---- | .9891 | .9353 |
| 73 | .9891 | ---- | .8734 |
| 78 | .9353 | .8734 | ---- |
| | 1.9244 | 1.8625 | 1.8087 |

Figure 2. O Data Matrix for Cluster II Years, Castro Data

| | 66 | 67 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 82 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 66 | ---- | .9498 | .9861 | .9651 | .9192 | .9650 | .9787 |
| 67 | .9498 | ---- | .9601 | .9420 | .8708 | .9716 | .7388 |
| 74 | .9861 | .9601 | ---- | .9751 | .8780 | .9360 | .9318 |
| 75 | .9651 | .9420 | .9751 | ---- | .7883 | .9196 | .9163 |
| 76 | .9192 | .8708 | .8780 | .7883 | ---- | .9271 | .9385 |
| 77 | .9650 | .9716 | .9360 | .9196 | .9271 | ---- | .9745 |
| 82 | .9787 | .7388 | .9318 | .9164 | .9385 | .9745 | ---- |
| | 5.7639 | 5.4331 | 5.6671 | 5.5065 | 5.3219 | 5.6938 | 5.4787 |

Figure 3. O Data Matrix for Cluster III Years, Castro Data

| | 69 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 83 | 84 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 69 | ---- | .9160 | .8812 | .8893 | .8071 | .6558 |
| 79 | .9160 | ---- | .7826 | .9166 | .7872 | .5303 |
| 80 | .8812 | .7826 | ---- | .7855 | .4416 | .9279 |
| 81 | .8893 | .9166 | .7855 | ---- | .7822 | .6123 |
| 83 | .8071 | .7872 | .4416 | .7822 | ---- | .1212 |
| 84 | .6558 | .5303 | .9279 | .6123 | .1212 | ---- |
| | 4.1494 | 3.9327 | 3.8188 | 3.9859 | 2.9393 | 2.8475 |

Figure 4 O Data Matrix for Cluster IV Years, Castro Data

| | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 75 | ---- | .8509 | .9729 | .9772 | .9698 | .9888 |
| 76 | .8509 | ---- | .7597 | .7756 | .7733 | .8377 |
| 77 | .9729 | .7597 | ---- | .9892 | .9989 | .9912 |
| 78 | .9772 | .7756 | .9892 | ---- | .9847 | .9837 |
| 79 | .9698 | .7733 | .9989 | .9847 | ---- | .9929 |
| 80 | .9888 | .8377 | .9912 | .9837 | .9929 | ---- |
| | 4.7586 | 3.9972 | 4.7119 | 4.7104 | 4.7196 | 4.7943 |

Figure 5. O Data Matrix for Cluster I Years, Granma Data

| | 68 | 69 | 71 | 81 | 84 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 68 | ---- | .8681 | .6687 | .6692 | .7697 |
| 69 | .8681 | ---- | .6932 | .8546 | .9281 |
| 71 | .6687 | .6932 | ---- | .9122 | .8442 |
| 81 | .6692 | .8546 | .9122 | ---- | .9751 |
| 84 | .7697 | .9281 | .8442 | .9751 | ---- |
| | 2.9757 | 3.3440 | 3.1183 | 3.4111 | 3.5171 |

Figure 6. O Data Matrix for Cluster II Years, Granma Data

| | 82 | 83 |
|---|---|---|
| 82 | ---- | .9604 |
| 83 | .9604 | ---- |
| | .9604 | .9604 |

Figure 9. O Data Matrix for Cluster V Years, Granma Data

NOTES

1. Lasswell, ibid., p. 199.

2. Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm, Four Theories of the Press (9th ed., Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1974), p. 2.

3. Phillip J. Tichenor, George A. Donohue and Clarice N. Olien, Community Conflict and the Press (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980).

4. John Spicer Nichols, "The Mass Media: Their Functions in Social Conflict," in Cuba: Internal and International Affairs, ed. by Jorge I. Dominguez (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 72-73.)

5. Nichols, ibid., p. 73.

6. Nichols, ibid., pp 73-74.

7. Nichols, ibid., p. 75.

8. Nichols, ibid., p. 107.

9. Nichols, ibid., p. 87.

10. Davison, op. cit., p. 196.

11. W. Phillips Davison and Alexander George, "An Outline for the Study of International Political Communication," in Schramm, Mass Communication, p. 433.

12. Davison, op. cit., p. 242.

13. Edward Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), p. 181.

14. Davison, "The Media Kaleidoscope," p. 227.

15. Nichols, op. cit., p. 75.

16. Robert Axelrod and William Zimmerman, "The Soviet Press

on Soviet Foreign Policy: A Usually Reliable Source," British Journal of Political Science, 11:197 (1981).

17. John Spicer Nichols, "Cuban Mass Media: Organization, Control and Functions," Journalism Monographs, 78:4 (1982).

18. Nichols, ibid., pp. 10-11.

19. Lee Lockwood, Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel (New York, 1969), p. 129, quoted in Nichols, op. cit., p. 24.

20. Gonzales, Cuba Under Castro, op. cit., p. 186.

21. Gonzalez, ibid., p. 77.

22. Gonzalez, ibid., p. 192.

23. Gonzalez, ibid., p. 217.

24. Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1910-1985 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), p. 278.

25. Lynn Darrell Bender, The Politics of Hostility: Castro's Revolution and United States Policy (Hato Rey, Puerto Rico: Inter American University Press, 1975), p. 85.

26. New York Times, Nov. 10, 1972, p. 20, quoted in Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 234.

27. Blasier, op. cit., p. 280.

28. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Economics of U.S.-Cuban Rapprochment," in Cuba in the Third World, ed. by Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), p. 199.

29. Gonzalez, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

30. Gonzalez, ibid., p. 19.

31. William LeoGrande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980

(Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1980), p. 8.

32. Blasier, op. cit., p. 280.

33. Mesa-Lago, op. cit., p. 199.

34. Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 23.

35. Mesa-Lago, op cit., pp. 218-219.

36. Blasier, op cit., p. 280.

37. Blasier, ibid.

38. Jorge Dominguez, U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 1980s: Issues and Policies," Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs, 27:17-34 (Fall, 1985), p. 31.

39. Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 79-81.

40. Blasier, op. cit., p. 280.

41. Mesa-Lago, op. cit., p. 199.

42. Pamela Falk, Cuban Foreign Policy: Caribbean Tempest (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 165.

43. Blasier, op. cit, p. 281.

44. Blasier, ibid.

45. Carla Anne Robbins, The Cuban Threat (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1983), pp. 294-295.

46. Falk, op. cit., p. 166.

47. Bender, op. cit., p. 49.

48. Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 183.

49. Gonzalez, ibid., p. 179.

50. Obra Revolucionaria, 2:42-43 (December 1961), quoted in Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 76.

51. Gramna, May 13, 1973, p. 1.

52. Granma, July 17, 1977, p. 3.

53. Granma, Aug. 5, 1984, p. 5.

54. Bender, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

55. Blasier, op. cit., p. 279.

56. Mesa-Lago, op. cit., p. 33.

57. Harold Lasswell, "The Language of Power," in Language of Politics, ed. by Harold Lasswell, Nathan Leites et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 13.

58. Lasswell, ibid., p. 9.

59. Lasswell, ibid., p. 13.

60. Harold Lasswell: "Style in the Language of Politics," in Language of Politics, p. 36.

61. Louis L. McQuitty, "Elementary Linkage Analysis for Isolating Orthogonal and Oblique Types and Typal Relevancies," Educational and Psychological Measurement, 17:207-229 (1957).

62. Fred N. Kirlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 576.

63. Malcolm S. MacLean Jr., "Some Multivariate Designs for Communications Research," Journalism Quarterly, 42:614-622 (1965).

64. Kerlinger, op. cit., p. 576.

65. Ole Holsti, "External Conflict and Internal Consensus: The Sino-Soviet Case." The General Inquirer, ed. Philip Stone et al. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 343-358.

66. Nichols, "Cuban Mass Media," op. cit., p. 1.

67. Granma, July 17, 1977, p. 4.